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I.  INTRODUCTION
Illinoisans, the cost of health care has just gone up.  The Illinois Supreme
Court has recently expanded the liability of tort defendants to include damages
for an increased risk of future injury not reasonably certain to occur.  In the
“good old days,” a doctor who botched a cancer diagnosis, causing a delay in
treatment and an increased risk of recurrence, could defend a suit based on
increased risk of recurrence with no liability at all by proving the chance of
recurrence was less than fifty percent (50%).  However, this hypothetical
doctor’s negligence will no longer go unpunished in Illinois.  The courts will
now attempt to predict the likelihood of the possible future injury and what the
amount of damages would be if the injury did, in fact, occur.
The thesis of this casenote is that damages for an increased risk of future
injury must always reflect the probability of the injury actually occurring, and
the most equitable answer to increased risk cases is allowing a separate action
to be brought when the feared future injury actually occurs.  Section II will
examine the background of awarding damages in enhanced risk cases by
looking at the approaches taken by other jurisdictions and then by looking at
how Illinois law has evolved on this issue.  Section III will summarize the facts,
procedural history, and opinion of the Dillon court.  Section IV will examine
the implications of Dillon and the possibility of splitting actions to allow
plaintiffs leave to file suit when a feared injury occurs.
II.  BACKGROUND
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1. Then Circuit Justice for United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
2. 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 367 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119).
4. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 112–13.
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6.  Wilson, 684 F.2d at 113.
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8. Id. at 114.
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A.  Approaches To Damages For Enhanced Risk
1.  Traditional Rule:  All-or-Nothing
Justice Ginsburg1 explained the traditional rule, which is also the majority
view, on damages for future injuries in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Corp.:2
The traditional American rule . . . is that recovery for damages based on
future consequences may be had only if such consequences are “reasonably
certain.”  Recovery of damages for speculative or conjectural future
consequences is not permitted.  To meet the “reasonably certain” standard,
courts have generally required plaintiffs to prove that it is more likely than
not (a greater than 50% chance) that the projected consequence will occur.
If such proof is made, the alleged future effect may be treated as certain to
happen and the injured party may be awarded full compensation for it.  If the
proof does not establish a greater than 50% chance, the injured party’s award
must be limited to damages for harm already manifest.3
In Wilson, the plaintiff began working in the insulation trade in 1941 and
was regularly exposed to asbestos as a part of his employment.4  Later in
1973, the plaintiff’s union provided a routine x-ray, which revealed that he
suffered from mild asbestosis.5  The plaintiff’s health rapidly deteriorated and
five years later he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer.6  He
died a few months later.7  The plaintiff’s wife filed a complaint for wrongful
death, which was dismissed with prejudice following a motion for summary
judgment by the defendant.8  The defendant argued the cause of action
accrued in 1973, when the plaintiff became aware he was suffering from an
asbestos-related disease, and that the three year statute of limitations barred
the survival action brought in 1979.9
The Wilson court noted the traditional all-or-nothing approach, when
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combined with a restrictive statute of limitations, would effectively bar the
plaintiff from being able to recover any damages for cancer, unless the cancer
becomes manifest during a timely filed lawsuit.10  The general policies behind
statutes of limitation are that the search for the truth is impaired by the loss of
evidence due to death, disappearance of witnesses, fading of memories,
protecting defendants from stale claims,  and allowing defendants to plan for
the future without endless potential liability.11  However, these policy
considerations are at odds in latent disease cases, where an injury may not
surface until several years after the exposure to the disease-causing agent.12
The Wilson court held that the diagnosis of the plaintiff’s “mild asbestosis”
in 1973 did not start the clock running on his right to sue for the separate and
distinct disease, mesothelioma, which arose from the same asbestos exposure,
but did not manifest itself until 1978.13  The defendant’s interest in repose from
potential liability was outweighed by evidentiary considerations, necessity of
providing compensation for latent injuries, and deterrence of uneconomical
anticipatory lawsuits.14  Several jurisdictions follow this “separate disease” or
“two disease” rule for latent diseases arising out of exposure to toxic
substances.15
2.  Increased Risk of Future Injury
Courts have been very reluctant to recognize an increased chance of an
adverse result as a compensable interest.  However, the traditional American
rule has been attacked for many reasons.  One of the first departures from the
traditional all-or-nothing approach was in the 1967 Pennsylvania case
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23. 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
24. Id. at 929.
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26. Id. at 932.
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Schwegel v. Goldberg.16  In Schwegel, a child was hit by a car and suffered
a skull fracture.17  The court held that since an action must be brought within
fixed time limitations and all damages, past, present, and future, must be
determined in that one action, it would be unfair to exclude damages for a five
percent (5%) chance of future epilepsy.18 
Similarly, the 1973 Oregon Supreme Court case Feist v. Sears, Roebuck
& Company19 also involved a minor who suffered a basal skull fracture.20
Medical expert testimony at trial stated it was not probable that meningitis
would develop, but the plaintiff was susceptible to such future complication.21
The Feist court ruled the medical testimony was properly received and the trial
court acted properly in instructing the jury that it could consider susceptibility
of meningitis in its award of damages.22
The 1984 Kentucky Supreme Court case Davis v. Graviss23 also involved
a plaintiff with a basal skull fracture who was facing future episodes of
cerebral spinal fluid leakage of an indeterminate frequency.24  This gave rise
to the potential for certain complications, including meningitis and other
neurological problems.25  The Davis court held that where there was
substantial evidence to support it, the jury could consider and compensate for
the increased likelihood of future complications.26
One of the leading cases on damages for increased risk of future injury is
the 1990 Connecticut Supreme Court case Petriello v. Kalman.27  In
Petriello, the defendant physician was performing a surgical procedure known
as a dilation and curettage to remove a dead fetus from the plaintiff’s womb.28
During the course of the procedure, the defendant, while using a suction
device, perforated the plaintiff’s uterus and drew portions of her small intestine
through the perforation, through her uterus and into her vagina.29  To correct
this surgical error, a bowel resection was performed, removing approximately
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one foot of the intestine and connecting the two ends of the remaining
intestine.30  At trial, the surgeon performing the resection testified adhesions
had probably formed in the plaintiff’s abdomen due to the resection and, as a
result, she had an eight percent (8%) to sixteen percent (16%) chance of
developing a bowel obstruction.31  
In Petriello, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that in a tort action,
a plaintiff who has established a breach of duty, which proves to be a
substantial factor in causing a present injury, and also increases the risk of
future harm, is entitled to compensation to the extent the future harm is likely
to occur.32  The Petriello court reasoned that the traditional all-or-nothing
approach, which denies any compensation unless a plaintiff proves a future
consequence is more likely than not to occur, has created a system in which
a significant number of persons receive compensation for future consequences
that never occur, and at the same time, a significant number of persons receive
no compensation at all for consequences which later develop.33 
The all-or-nothing approach is inconsistent with the goal of compensating
tort victims fairly for all the consequences of the injuries they have sustained,
while avoiding windfall awards for consequences which never occur . 34
Plaintiffs in negligence cases are confronted by the requirements that they
must claim all applicable damages in a single cause of action.35  Therefore, a
plaintiff would be effectively barred from recovery for future consequences
of an injury when the evidence at trial does not satisfy the “more probable than
not” criterion.36  On the other hand, a defendant cannot seek reimbursement
from a plaintiff who has recovered for a future consequence, which appeared
likely at the time of trial, on the ground that subsequent events have made the
likelihood of the consequence occurring remote or impossible. 37  Most
jurisdictions provide no opportunity for a second look at a damage award so
that it may be revised with the benefit of hindsight.38
The Petriello court viewed the matter as an attempt to establish the
plaintiff’s present injuries, rather than an attempt to claim damages for a future
event.39  The court also noted there was no question that such a degree of
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probability of the occurrence of future injury would not support an award of
damages to the same extent as if that injury had actually occurred.40  The
court concluded it would be fairer to instruct the jury to compensate the
plaintiff for the increased risk of a bowel obstruction based upon the likelihood
of its occurrence rather than to ignore the risk entirely.41
Damages for the future consequences of an injury can never be forecast
with certainty.42  Actuarial tables of average life expectancy are commonly
used to assist the trier of fact in measuring the loss a plaintiff is likely to sustain
from the future effects of a permanent injury.43  Such statistical evidence does,
of course, satisfy the “more likely than not” standard as to the duration of a
permanent injury.44  Similar evidence, based upon medical statistics of the
average incidence of a particular future consequence from an injury, may be
said to establish with the same degree of certitude the likelihood of the
occurrence of the future harm to which a tort victim is exposed as a result of
a present injury. 45  “Such evidence provides an adequate basis for measuring
damages for the risk to which the victim has been exposed because of a
wrongful act.”46
B.  History of Damages for Increased Risk in Illinois Prior to Dillon
Illinois has historically rejected assessing damages for future injuries.47  In
the 1909 case Amann v. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co.,48 the Supreme
Court of Illinois held, “[a] mere possibility, or even a reasonable probability,
that future pain or suffering may be caused by an injury, or that some disability
may result therefrom, is not sufficient to warrant an [award] of damages.”49
It would be unjust to require a defendant to pay damages for results that may
or may not occur.50  To justify a recovery for future damages, the law requires
proof of reasonable certainty the injury will actually occur in the future.51
Expert witnesses can only testify or give their opinion as to future
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c onsequences shown to be reasonably certain to follow.52  It is impossible to
determine with absolute certainty what the result of such an injury might be in
the future, but something more than mere conjecture or mere probabilities
should appear to warrant an award of damages for future disabilities which
may never be realized.53
The First District of the Appellate Court of Illinois had followed the
traditional rule as recently as 1979, denying recovery for future injuries not
reasonably certain to occur.  In Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co.,54 the plaintiff
alleged that exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) in utero created a mere
possibility of developing cancer and other future injuries.55  The Morrissy
court held that in Illinois possible future damages in a personal injury action are
not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur.56  
Similarly, the 1991 Fourth District case of Wehmeier v. UNR Industries,
Inc.57 followed the traditional rule.  In Wehmeier, the plaintiff introduced
evidence of his increased risk of contracting cancer because of his exposure
to asbestos.58  However, the court held that the evidence presented on the
increased risk of contracting cancer should not have been admitted, since
damages may not be awarded on the basis of conjecture or speculation and
must be proved to be the proximate result of the complained of wrong.59
However, the Fifth District had previously carved out an exception to the
traditional rule in the 1977 case Harp v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.60
The Harp court held that as a general rule, possible future damages are not
compensable unless they are reasonably certain to occur.61  In Harp, a
physician testified that a rupture of a disc in the plaintiff’s back was reasonably
certain to occur if sufficient force or trauma was exerted upon it.62  Under the
general rule, the plaintiff was required to bear the risk of the occurrence of the
force and avoid those activities which could result in trauma or force upon the
disc.63  The court found an exception to the general rule, holding that the risk
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65. 414 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
66. Id. at 890.
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69. 477 N.E.2d 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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74. 664 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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of injury is properly compensable as comprising part of the pain and suffering
recovery and can be considered in its effect on the earning capacity of the
plaintiff, since pain and suffering and impairment of the ability to labor are
proper elements of damage in a personal injury suit.64
The Second District also allowed a plaintiff to present evidence of an
increased risk of future injury in the 1980 case Lindsay v. Appleby.65  The
Lindsay court allowed medical testimony that the injuries sustained in a
collision caused a plaintiff to develop a potential for seizures.66  The Lindsay
court held that the testimony presented evidence tending to show an increased
risk of further injury caused by the defendant’s conduct, and as such, was
admissible as tending to show plaintiff’s future damages.67  The court cited to
Harp68 in support of its holding, but gave no rationale for its departure from
precedent.
The 1985 Third District case Jeffers v. Weinger69 also broke from
precedent without giving any rationale or citing case law in support of its
decision.70  Jeffers involved a medical malpractice claim where the
defendant’s alleged negligence caused the plaintiff to develop a neurological
ulcer on her foot.71  A medical expert testified on cross-examination that the
possibility of the plaintiff losing her foot was less than one percent (1%).72
Nevertheless, the court found that whether there is a one percent (1%)
possibility or a ninety-nine percent (99%) possibility, each is an element of
damages which should be considered by the jury.73
The Third District revisited the issue in the 1996 case of Anderson v.
Golden.74  Anderson involved a medical malpractice claim where the
defendant physician removed a growth from the plaintiff’s shoulder, but failed
to have it tested by a pathologist.75  The growth recurred in 1992 and was
diagnosed as dermatofibrosarcoma protuberans, a cancerous condition
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necessitating further surgery.76  The plaintiff’s expert witnesses were prepared
to testify that if the defendant had properly treated her, the plaintiff would have
had a five percent (5%) chance of recurrence and a five percent (5%) chance
of metastasis.77  Due to the delay in proper treatment, the plaintiff had a thirty
percent (30%) to forty percent (40%) chance of recurrence and a twenty
percent (20%) chance of metastasis.78  The question presented on
interlocutory appeal was:  
Assuming that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action has established that
the negligence of the defendant has to a reasonable degree of certainty
caused injury to the plaintiff, may the plaintiff present evidence to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the plaintiff is at an increased risk of
future harm as a result of the injury she has sustained, even if the increased
risk of future harm is less than fifty percent (50%) likely to occur?79
The Anderson court followed the new trend of cases allowing
compensation for increased risk of future injury as long as it could be shown
to a reasonable degree of certainty that the defendant’s wrongdoing created
the increased risk.80  However, the court still attempted to harmonize its
holding with the existing precedent stating, “[t]he treatment of an increased
risk of future injury as a present injury does not run afoul of the general rule
that possible future damages are not compensable absent evidence that such
damages are reasonably certain to occur.  This rule stems from the principle
that damages may not be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture.”81
If it can be shown to a reasonable degree of certainty that the risk was
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence, then there is no element of
speculation or conjecture.82
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
A.  Statement of Facts
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Diane Dillon (“Dillon”) was being treated for breast cancer.83  On April
20, 1989, Dr. Stephen Sener (“Sener”) surgically inserted a catheter into a vein
in Dillon’s upper chest under the clavicle.84  The purpose of the catheter was
to provide a means to administer chemotherapy and to draw blood without
repeatedly inserting needles into Dillon’s veins.85  The catheter used on Dillon
was approximately sixteen centimeters long.86  
After Dillon completed chemotherapy, the catheter was no longer
necessary.87  On July 13, 1990, Sener removed the catheter.88  However,
unbeknownst to both Dillon and himself, Sener had only removed a seven-
centimeter portion of the catheter, while a nine-centimeter fragment remained
in Dillon’s chest.89  Dillon had a chest x-ray taken at the hospital in December
1990, but was not informed of any abnormalities at that time.90
In December 1991, Dillon had a routine chest x-ray taken at a different
hospital.91  The x-ray revealed that the catheter fragment had migrated to
Dillon’s heart and the tip of the fragment was embedded in the wall of either
the right atrium or right ventricle.92  The rest of the fragment was floating free
in Dillon’s heart.93
Dillon met with Sener after she learned the fragment was embedded in her
heart.94  Sener could not specifically recall removing the catheter from Dillon,
but acknowledged the fragment was in her heart.95  Based on the length of
time the fragment had been in her heart, Sener recommended that Dillon not
attempt to have the fragment removed.96  There were several risks attendant
to removal: all or part of the fragment could escape and travel further into the
heart, making retrieval more difficult, or removal could tear the heart wall.97
Sener believed it would be more dangerous to attempt to remove the catheter
fragment than it would be to leave it in place.98
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Dillon sought opinions from other physicians, and all but one agreed with
Sener that it would be safer to leave the fragment in her heart.99  Based on
these opinions, Dillon decided to leave the catheter fragment in her heart.100
B.  Procedural History
The plaintiff, Dillon, filed her original complaint on July 1, 1992.101
Notably, the original complaint contained no allegations against Sener or
Evanston Hospital (“the hospital”) that the insertion of the catheter was
negligent, but only alleged negligent removal.102  The original complaint was
amended several times throughout the pretrial proceedings as discovery was
being conducted.103  
On November 17, 1997, Dillon moved to file her fifth amended complaint
adding allegations that the catheter was improperly inserted.104 The trial court
allowed Dillon leave to file because the removal of the catheter was, according
to the court, "a completion of the same process" as the insertion.105  Counts I
and II alleged that Sener and the hospital negligently inspected, inserted, and
removed the catheter; failed to ascertain that the catheter fragment remained
in plaintiff; and failed to advise plaintiff that the fragment remained in her
body.106 Count III alleged that Sener's actions should be considered negligent
under the theory of res ipsa loquitur.107  
There was evidence presented at trial which established a causal
connection between the actions of Sener and the hospital and the catheter
fragment becoming embedded in Dillon’s heart.108  The risks of the catheter
remaining in Dillon’s heart were infection, perforation of the heart, arrhythmia,
embolization, and further migration of the fragment.109  Several physicians
testified about the risk of infection, with the lowest estimated risk being close
to zero and the highest being twenty percent (20%), while the risk of
arrhythmia was less than five percent (5%), the risk of perforation and
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115. Id .   See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., No. 1–98–2893 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
116. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 372 (Ill. 2002).  The jury instruction addressing
compensation for plaintiff's increased risks stated in relevant part: 
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix
the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate her for any
of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have the pain
and suffering experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the
future as a result of the injuries. This instruction was a modified combination
of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.01 and No. 30.05 (3d
ed.1995).  The modification was the addition of the italicized sentence on the
increased risk of future injuries. There is no Illinois pattern jury instruction for
that element of damages.  
Id. at 366.
117. Id. at 371.
118. Id. at 372.
migration were also small, and the risk of embolization was low to
nonexistent.110
At the close of the trial, the jury found in favor of Dillon and against Sener
and the hospital.111  Sener and the hospital did not present the jury with any
special interrogatories to determine on which basis the jury found defendants
to have been negligent.112  The jury awarded Dillon $1.5 million for past pain
and suffering, $1.5 million for future pain and suffering, and $500,000 for the
increased risk of future injuries.113  Dillon had not sought compensation for
past or future medical expenses.114 
Sener and the hospital appealed and the First District Appellate Court
affirmed, with one judge dissenting.115  However, the Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed Dillon’s damages award for the increased risk of future injury and
remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial solely on the issue of
damages, since the jury was inadequately instructed.116  The instruction failed
to instruct the jury that the increased risk must be based on evidence and not
speculation, and more importantly, the size of the award must reflect the
probability of occurrence.117  The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court and appellate court on all other issues.118
C.  Majority Opinion
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The main issue addressed by the Supreme Court of Illinois was whether
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could award the plaintiff
damages for the increased risk of future injuries.119  The court adopted the
reasoning of Petriello120 and Anderson.121  The majority agreed with the
rationale that the increased risk is itself a present injury, which should be as
compensable as any other present injury.122  
Further, the court noted that based on the principle of single recovery, our
legal system provides no opportunity for a second look at a damage award so
it may be revisited with the benefit of hindsight.123  A plaintiff cannot bring
successive actions for a single tort as he suffers damages in the future.124
Rather, his one action must include prospective as well as accrued damages.125
“This in turn faces the tribunal with the difficult and uncertain task of
prophecy, with no chance for second-guessing where the prophecy turns out
to be mistaken, or where the parties have failed to present all items of their
claims.”126 
The majority also recognized the similarity between the concept of
damages for increased risk of future injury and the concept of awarding
damages for loss of a chance of recovery or survival:   
To the extent a plaintiff's chance of recovery or survival is lessened by the
malpractice, he or she should be able to present evidence to a jury that the
defendant's malpractice, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
proximately caused the increased risk of harm or lost chance of recovery. We
therefore reject the reasoning of cases which hold, as a matter of law, that
plaintiffs may not recover for medical malpractice injuries if they are unable
to prove that they would have enjoyed a greater than 50% chance of survival
or recovery absent the alleged malpractice of the defendant.127
The majority noted that its prior holdings in Stevens128 and Amann129 were
over eighty years old, and scientific advances now enable the medical
community to more accurately determine the probability of future injuries than
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compensation to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the harm in question
were certain to occur by the proven probability that the harm in question will
in fact occur.
Id. at 371–72.
133. Id. at 372.
134. Id. at 373 (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. (quoting ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil, No. 1.01(3) (1995)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
in the past.130  Thus, the court reasoned there was less risk of undue
speculation in determining damages for increased risk of future injury.131
Finally, the court approved the jury instruction promulgated following the
Petriello case,132 stating, “this instruction fairly and correctly states the law on
this element of damages.”133
D.  Chief Justice Harrison:  Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
Chief Justice Harrison wrote separately to express his opinion that the jury
instruction given by the trial court was adequate.134  He reasoned that all juries
are instructed that their verdict “must be based on evidence and not upon
speculation, guess, or conjecture.”135  Chief Justice Harrison further noted that
the use of the term “risk” in the jury instruction by the trial court adequately
informed the jury that the size of the award should reflect the probability of
future injury occurring.136  He would have affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court and appellate court without any qualification.137
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IV.  ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Dillon provides several convincing policy
arguments in favor of awarding damages for an increased risk of future injury
as a present injury and against the traditional all-or-nothing approach.  First, the
all-or-nothing approach is inconsistent with the goal of compensating tort
victims fairly for all the injuries they have sustained, while avoiding, so far as
possible, windfall awards for consequences that never happen.138 Second, the
principle of single recovery requires a plaintiff to present all of her damages
in a single action.139 Third, damages for increased risk of future injury are
similar to damages for loss of a chance.140 Lastly, damage awards are less
prone to being based on speculation, since medical advances allow for more
accurate determinations of the probability of future injuries occurring.141 
However, the majority opinion failed to address what damages a plaintiff
is entitled to for an increased risk of future injury that is more likely than not
to occur (greater than a 50% chance of occurrence) and limited its holding to
cases where future injury is not reasonably certain to occur.  Awarding
damages for an increased risk of future injury creates windfalls in favor of
plaintiffs when the award is not reduced to reflect the probability of the injury
actually occurring.  The Dillon court also failed to consider the possibility of
splitting the action to allow the plaintiff to bring a separate action if a future
injury were to occur.  The most equitable answer to damages for increased
risk of future injuries is to allow a separate action to be brought if the feared
future injury actually occurs.  
A.  Damages For Increased Risk of Future Injuries Should Always Reflect
the Probability of the Future Injury Occurring
The majority opinion in Dillon makes much of the disparate impac t
occurring under the traditional all-or-nothing approach which allows a plaintiff
to receive full compensation if she shows a greater than fifty percent (50%)
chance of the injury occurring, while completely denying recovery if a plaintiff
shows less than a fifty percent (50%) chance that the injury will result.142
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However, by awarding damages based on the probability that the future injury
will occur, the court is effectively guaranteeing that no claim for increased risk
of future injury will ever be accurately compensated.  Every damage award
will amount to a windfall for the plaintiff or the defendant.  For example, if the
future injury did actually occur to the plaintiff, he would be
under-compensated, since the plaintiff’s damages would have been reduced
to reflect the low probability of the injury occurring at the time of trial.  On the
other hand, if the injury never occurs, the plaintiff receives a windfall in the
form of damages for an injury that will never be suffered.
A careful reading of the Dillon case indicates the opinion only addressed
the precise issue of whether a plaintiff may recover damages for an increased
risk not reasonably certain to occur or, in other words, a less than a fifty
percent (50%) chance of occurrence.  First, the language of the opinion clearly
and plainly limits the holding to cases where the future injury is not reasonably
c ertain to occur.143  The majority states, “we hold . . . a plaintiff can obtain
compensation for a future injury that is not reasonably certain to occur, but
the compensation would reflect the low probability of occurrence.”144  If it
were the intention of the Dillon court to extend its holding to all claims for
increased risk of future injury, including situations where the future injury is
more likely than not to occur, the court could have easily deleted the words
“that is not reasonably certain to occur” to extend the holding to all increased
risk cases.  Secondly, the facts of the Dillon case are distinguishable from any
case where an increased risk of future injury is more than fifty percent (50%),
since Dillon involved future injuries which were not reasonably certain to
occur.145  Therefore, the traditional all-or-nothing approach would still apply
when a plaintiff proves that his future injury is more likely than not to occur,
allowing a plaintiff full recovery as if the future injury had actually occurred.
The law regarding damages for future injuries has been definitively tipped
in favor of plaintiffs.  For example, if a plaintiff can show a sixty percent
(60%) increased chance of a future injury due to the defendant’s negligence
and shows he will have damages of $100,000 if the injury occurs, then he will
be awarded the full $100,000.  His recovery will not be reduced to $60,000 to
reflect the less than certain chance of the future injury ever occurring.
Plaintiffs will get the benefit of doubt in these “more likely than not” cases
because courts will treat something that is “more likely than not” as though it
is a certainty for the purpose of awarding damages.  The Dillon court has
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148. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences ,  90  YA LE L.J. 1353, 1376–81 (1981)
(criticizing the traditional all-or-nothing approach).
essentially robbed defendants of a similar benefit of the doubt where a
defendant shows that it is “more likely than not” that the future injury will not
occur.  Under the traditional all-or-nothing approach, courts would treat a
showing of less than a fifty percent (50%) increased risk of future injury as
certain that the future injury would not occur.  Damages must always be
reduced to reflect the less than certain probability of the feared injury actually
happening, even when an injury is more likely than not to occur.  
A pure pro-rata approach146 would strike a more equitable balance
between plaintiffs and defendants than the current damages regime of Illinois
(“the Illinois approach”), which awards full damages when future injuries are
more likely than not to occur and awards discounted damages147 when the
future injuries are not reasonably certain to occur.  Consider the following
hypothetical:  a doctor treats one hundred patients negligently and through his
negligence causes each patient to have a one percent (1%) increased risk of
a $100,000 future injury.  Under both the pure pro-rata approach and the
Illinois approach, he would be liable to each of the one hundred patients for
$1,000 for a total of $100,000.  Theoretically, only one of the patients would
actually experience the future injury.  This unfortunate patient would be grossly
under-compensated for his injury by $99,000, while his fellow ninety-nine
patients would each pocket their $1,000 without suffering the feared future
injury.  The deterrent effect on the defendant doctor would be the same as if
the court could see into the future and know for certain which patient would
develop the injury in the future.  The doctor has caused a single future injury
in the amount of $100,000 and he has been required to pay damages in that
amount.  Under the traditional all-or-nothing approach, none of these patients
would have been able to recover any damages, since none of the patients
would be able to show their future injury was “more likely than not” to occur.
The doctor would escape liability for a $100,000 injury resulting from his
negligence.148
Consider a similar hypothetical situation:  a doctor negligently treats one
hundred patients again, but instead causes each patient a ninety-nine percent
(99%) increased chance of a $100,000 future injury.  Now, under the pure
pro-rata approach, the doctor would have to pay $99,000 to each of the one
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hundred patients to reflect the probability that one of the one hundred patients
will not experience the future injury.  However, in this situation, the Illinois
approach reaches the same result as the traditional all-or-nothing approach.
The doctor would be required to pay $100,000 to each of the one hundred
patients, even though only ninety-nine of the patients will actually experience
the future injury.  The doctor would be over-deterred, since one lucky patient
would receive a $100,000 windfall for the increased risk of a future injury
which will never occur.  The plaintiffs, as a whole, are over-compensated for
their actual injuries.  
When the traditional all-or-nothing approach is applied to all increased risk
cases, regardless of whether the future injury is more or less likely than not to
occur, the injustice to defendants is minimized.  While a defendant is over-
deterred if his negligence causes a future injury to be more likely than not to
occur, the defendant is also under-deterred when his negligence causes a risk
of a future injury that is not reasonably certain to occur.  The combination of
over-deterrence and under-deterrence tend to balance each other out, which
would theoretically provide the same overall deterrent effect as the pure pro-
rata approach.  
To summarize, the traditional rule under-compensates and under-deters
negligence when there is less than a fifty percent (50%) chance of the injury
occurring, while over-compensating and over-deterring negligence when there
is more than a fifty percent (50%) chance of the injury occurring.  The Illinois
approach provides ideal deterrence and compensation in the first instance
when a future injury is not reasonably certain to occur, but also provides the
same over-compensation and over-deterrence as the traditional all-or-nothing
rule in cases where the future injury is more likely than not to occur.  Only a
pure pro-rata approach would strike an ideal balance between plaintiffs and
defendants in any situation.  The bottom line, as presented by the Dillon
holding, is that the amount of damages paid by defendants for future injuries
will, in aggregate, exceed the amount that plaintiffs would have actually been
awarded had the full extent of their injuries been known at the time of trial.
B.  Single Controversy vs. Splitting of Action
Trial courts cannot see into the future.  All they can do is make a
prediction based on evidence and testimony presented by the parties at trial.
However, if the trial court could wait to award damages until after the injury
actually occurs, the court could make a much more accurate determination of
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152. The entire controversy or single controversy doctrine provides, “[a]n entire claim arising
from a single tort cannot be divided and be the subject of several actions, regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff has recovered all that he or she might have recovered.”  Dillon
v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 369 (Ill. 2002). 
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a plaintiff’s true damages.149  The generally accepted rationale for permitting
recovery for future damages is that the injured party may usually only bring
one action for the recovery of all damages resulting from a single incident,
irrespective of whether such damages may be present or prospective.150  If the
plaintiff fails to pursue recovery for future damages he will ordinarily be unable
to institute another action when the damages actually accrue.151  The single
controversy doctrine152 has been developed to prevent delay, expense, and
waste created when litigation is fragmented.153  
Allowing a separate action to be brought for a future injury by relaxing the
single controversy rule is not a novel concept.  It is common to split actions in
toxic  tort litigation, where damages for increased risk of future injury are
usually barred.154  Many analogies can be drawn between the fact pattern in
Dillon and the typical asbestos case.  For example, in Simmons v. Pacor,
Inc.,155 the plaintiffs brought an action for damages resulting from occupational
exposure to asbestos.156  As an element of those damages, plaintiffs sought
relief for increased risk of cancer, even though none of the plaintiffs had
contracted mesothelioma or cancer at the time the suits were filed.157  Instead
they were all diagnosed with asbestos-related pleural thickening, which is the
formation of calcified tissue on the membranes surrounding the lungs.158
Although the condition is normally detectable by x-ray, pleural thickening did
not cause any lung impairment.159  The Simmons court held that the injury was
not compensable since there was no physical injury necessitating the awarding
of damages.160  Also, due to the two-disease rule, plaintiffs were not precluded
from bringing another action for an asbestos-related injury if symptoms
developed.161
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162. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ill. 2002). 
163. Id.
164. The Illinois statute of limitations for personal actions against physicians and hospitals
provides:
   (a) Except as provided in Section 13–215 of this Act, no action for damages
for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital
duly licensed under the laws of this State,  whether based upon tort, or breach
of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more
than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the
existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action,
whichever of such dat e occurs first, but in no event shall such action be
brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or
omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such
injury or death.
   (b) Except as provided in Section 13–215 of this Act, no action for damages
for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital
duly licensed under the laws of this State,  whether based upon tort, or breach
of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more
than 8 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or
occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or
death where the person entitled to bring the action was, at the time the cause
of action accrued, under the age of 18 years; provided, however, that in no
event may the cause of action be brought after the person's 22nd birthday. If
t he person was under the age of 18 years when the cause of action accrued and,
as a result of this amendatory Act of 1987, the action is either barred or there
remains less than 3 years to bring such action, then he or she may bring the
action within 3 years of July 20, 1987.
   (c) If the person entitled to bring an action described in this Section is, at
the time the cause of action accrued, under a legal disability other than being
under the age of 18 years, then the period of limitations does not begin to run
until the disability is removed.
735 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/13–212 (2002).
165. Id.
In Dillon, the catheter fragment lodged in the plaintiff’s heart was
detectible by x-ray.162  Dillon had no disabling consequences as a result of the
fragment in her heart,163 but because of the statute of limitations164 and the
single controversy rule, she had no choice but to bring suit before the full
extent of her injuries could possibly be known.  Both Dillon and Simmons
essentially involve a non-removable foreign object becoming imbedded in the
vital organs of the plaintiffs due to the defendants’ negligence, which in turn
puts the plaintiffs at risk of a latent disease or injury that may or may not
appear in the future.  The key difference between these suits lies in the
applicable statute of limitation.  In Illinois, a medical malpractice suit usually
must be brought within four years of the event leading to the suit,165 while a
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products liability suit against a manufacturer, producer, or distributor may be
brought up to twelve years after the initial sale or use of the defective
product.166  For a “separate disease” rule to be workable in Illinois, the state
legislature would need to extend the statute of limitations to allow an adequate
amount of time for the latent disease or injury to occur.
The rule against splitting causes of action is founded on the policy that
finality in litigation promotes greater stability in the law, avoids vexatious and
multiple lawsuits arising out of a single tort incident, and is consistent with the
absolute necessity of bringing litigation to an end.167  In a medical malpractice
action, it is clear that the defendant health care provider would much rather rid
itself of liability after a single trial, rather than defend multiple actions every
time a plaintiff develops a new condition which may arguably be connected to
its prior negligence.  
However, “the fear of an expansion of litigation should not deter courts
from granting relief in meritorious litigation; the proper remedy is an expansion
of the judicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of justice.”168
There is ample authority for the proposition that a court deciding an issue in a
first action may decide that a plaintiff’s right to maintain a later action is
reserved.169  While the idea of unresolved liability for future injuries is
unattractive to the medical community, it may be better than having to defend
a full trial and pay damages in cases involving only a slight increased risk of
future injury.  Some courts have found that splitting causes of actions can
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actually promote judicial economy.170  Splitting actions discourages anticipatory
lawsuits and the protraction of pending lawsuits to allow potential injuries to
surface.171  In Dillon, the highest estimate of the chance of any future injury
to the plaintiff was twenty percent (20%), 172 so it is likely that litigation on
these issues would never be necessary.  By allowing Dillon to bring a separate
action if any of the feared diseases or injuries should arise, Dillon would have
peace of mind knowing she could still file suit if any of the potential injuries
should occur in the future.  She would be able to present real and accurate
evidence of the full extent of her injuries, rather than speculative guesses.
Furthermore, she would be fully compensated for her injuries, rather than
receiving a mere fraction of her damages at a time when it was unknown
whether the feared injuries would ever actually come to pass.
V.  CONCLUSION
A plaintiff in Illinois may now obtain compensation for an increased risk
of future injury not reasonably certain to occur, but the compensation must
reflect the low probability of the occurrence. 173  The Dillon court did not
appear to extend its holding to cases where the feared future injury is more
likely than not to occur.  The Dillon decision has created a win-win situation
for plaintiffs: a plaintiff will be fully compensated, as though the injury were
certain to occur, if he can show that a feared future injury is more likely than
not to occur; and if the plaintiff fails to meet the more likely than not standard,
he will still receive damages which reflect the likelihood of the feared injury
occurring.  Damages for increased risk of future injury must always reflect the
probability that the injury will occur.  However, the best solution would be to
allow plaintiffs to bring a separate action if the feared future injury ever
actually materializes.  This is the only way to award damages accurately and
without undue speculation.
